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ABSTRACT: The IEEE 1149.1 standard (boundary-scan) was originally developed as a technology to pro-
vide in-circuit testing of digital devices. Its effectiveness lead to unanticipated successes such as its extension 
to support on-line monitoring and in-circuit emulation. Meanwhile, its applicability for fault-injection had al-
ready been demonstrated by academic prototypes. In this paper we describe the first commercial tool, the 
BSCAN4FI plug in for Xception®, that provides support for software reliability evaluation for aeronautics and 
space applications using the boundary-scan technology as a means for controlled fault-injection. This tool al-
lows transparent integration testing without any modification to the original system to be deployed and was 
developed specifically for the SPARC V.7 TSC695f  space processor. Besides extended fault models and test 
features only made possible through this technology, in-system non-intrusive monitoring capabilities are also 
made possible.
1 INTRODUCTION
For many years fault-injection has been regarded as 
a major player in dependability assurance. It is com-
monly used for deriving coverage probabilities, as-
sessing the effectiveness and validating fault and er-
ror handling mechanisms. Fault-injection addresses 
a topic that can't be adequately handled by the more 
traditional testing techniques, because rather than fo-
cus on the correct functioning of systems, it address-
es the point of anticipating anomalous behavior un-
der unexpected circumstances. 
Many fault-injectors have been developed and de-
scribed  in  the  literature,  with  very  different  ap-
proaches on how to disturb the target system.  Physi-
cal (Arlat et al. 1989, Karlsson et al. 1994), software 
(Carreira  et  al.  1995)  and  simulated  (Jenn  et  al. 
1994)  fault-injection methodologies  have  been de-
vised for this purpose. A comprehensive description 
of  fault-injection  methods  and  tools  is  given  in 
Hsueh (1997).
 The point is that different approaches to fault-in-
jection can lead to different results, since the differ-
ent system abstractions considered are seldom com-
parable (Karlsson et al. 1995). Thus different tools 
provide complementary rather than  alternative ap-
proaches. For example, while it is true that software 
implemented fault-injection SWIFI provides a level of 
control  and  efficiency  hardly  achievable  by  other 
techniques, it  is also true that pin-level fault-injec-
tion  may  induce  situations  impossible  to  emulate 
through  software  (e.g.  during  a  system restart)  or 
when the use of SWIFI is cumbersome or simply can't 
be applied (e.g. in communication ASICs).
Nevertheless,  pin-level  fault-injection  has  been 
almost abandoned due to several reasons: its target 
dependency prevents tool  reusability,  the technical 
constraints  posed  by  the  back-driving  effects  may 
lead to target damage (burn-out) and the increasingly 
high working frequencies makes a controlled distur-
bance  a  technically  complex  goal.  So,  despite  the 
perception that, at the physical level no other tech-
nique can provide the same insight on unpredictable 
failure modes and anomalous system behavior, pin-
level fault-injection is restricted to a niche in auto-
motive electronics and some chip-makers of propri-
etary communication devices (e.g. Cisco Systems).
In this paper we present an extension to the capa-
bilities of the Xception fault-injection tool by using 
the IEEE Standard 1149.1 (Boundary-Scan), to cov-
er the low-level abstraction layers in an integrated 
fault-injection  framework.  This  technology  allows 
extended hardware fault-injection support as well as 
emulation of software errors.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next sec-
tion we present an overview of IEEE 1149.1 and a 
critical  analysis  on the use  of  boundary-scan as  a 
support for fault-injection. In Section 3 we present 
the BSCAN4FI plug-in and how it fully exploits the po-
tentials  of  using  boundary-scan  for  fault-injection 
purposes. In the section that follows a case-study il-
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lustrating the use of such plug-in is presented. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper with an overview of the 
tool and the next steps that will be followed.
2 USING IEEE 1149.1 FOR FAULT-INJECTION
The Boundary-Scan technology became a standard 
in 1990. Since then it received three revisions, being 
the last one made in 2001 and known as IEEE Std 
1149.1-2001―Standard  Test  Access  Port  and 
Boundary-Scan  Architecture, IEEE  (2001).  The 
driving force behind this standard were two continu-
ing trends having significant adverse impact on the 
cost of testing printed circuit boards in the 80's: in-
creasing  complexity  and  greater  miniaturization. 
Complexity makes functional testing longer due to 
the need to propagate test data through the complex 
ICs while applying tests to other chips on the board. 
Miniaturization  limits  physical  probing,  a  method 
through which structural tests were performed.
To overcome these constraints IEEE 1149.1 pro-
vides a logical test-access mechanism into the ICs 
themselves. The boundary-scan path consists of a se-
ries of Boundary Scan Cells (BSC) added at every 
digital  I/O  pin  on  a  component.  The  resulting 
Boundary Scan Register and other test features are 
accessed through a standard JTAG  (Joint Test Action 
Group)  interface  ― the  TAP  (Test  Access  Port). 
Through it, test instructions and test data are shifted 
in,  and  test  data  results  are  shifted-out.  Boundary 
scan cells allow to control, observe, or take both ac-
tions on system signals.
Figure 1 presents the overall test logic architec-
ture.  As shown,  the  boundary-scan  register  is  just 
one of the test data registers present. All of them, as 
well as the Instruction Register (IR), share the same 
generic  structure:  a  shift-register  matched  with  an 
optional latch. The entire logic is synchronously ac-
cessed through the four mandatory pins of the TAP: 
TMS (mode select), TCK (clock), TDI (data-in) and 
TDO (data-out).
 The first two pins drive the TAP controller ― a 
state machine that defines the register type (data/in-
struction)  present  between the  last  two pins  (TDI, 
TDO) and the sequence of operations performed on 
it: capture, shift and update. Capture loads the shift 
register with data present on its parallel inputs. The 
Shift operation allows the captured data to be exam-
ined on TDO and new input data to be entered on 
TDI. Update makes the new data to become active, 
i.e. loaded on the latch and present on the parallel 
outputs  of  the  selected  register.  The  optional  pin 
TRST may be used to asynchronously reset the test 
logic.
Through  this  infrastructure  we  can  access  and 
modify the boundary-scan register. Thus we have a 
direct access to the IC pins. However, in many mod-
ern ICs like complex ASIC, DSP and microproces-
sors, most operations are performed inside the chip. 
This fact, sustained by advanced techniques such as 
internal memories, prefetching and speculative exe-
cution, reduces the effectiveness of acting only on 
the boundary of such circuits. At the same time such 
complex ICs are actually the more common targets 
in need of fault-injection activity. Fortunately, sever-
al vendors enrich the complex ICs they produce with 
an extensive set of additional test data registers inte-
grated into the  IEEE 1149.1 infrastructure. Accord-
ing to the standard, these registers may be provided 
to allow access to any test-support features embed-
ded in the design. These features might include scan-
test, self-test registers, test data registers that cover 
the cache, the general purpose registers file (includ-
ing the floating-point unit), the status and debugging 
registers  and even access to  the pipeline registers. 
Thus,  the  boundary-scan  infrastructure  provides  a 
means to access not only the IC pins, but also inter-
nal structures, some of which are not accessible even 
through the target instruction set. So, while the use 
of boundary-scan to perform fault-injection was sug-
gested since the standard's inception (Sedmak et al. 
1994),  this  extended reachability  disclosed  its  full 
potential.
In the next section we present the BSCAN4FI project 
which was inspired by the work on  GOOFI presented 
in   (Folkesson et  al.  1998,  Folkesson 1999, Aide-
mark et al. 2001).
3 THE BSCAN4FI APPROACH
This  project  extends  the  pure  SWIFI approach  in 
which Xception was originally based by providing 
support  for  boundary-scan  technology.  The 
TSC695F single chip implementation of the SPARC 
v7  compatible  ERC32  open-source  processor  was 
chosen. Its development was supported by the Euro-
pean Space Agency (ESA) being currently used in 
Europe, China and Brazil for aeronautical and space 
related applications.
We shall now describe how the  BSCAN4FI plug-in 
supports a typical fault-injection campaign. The first 
step is to define the trigger conditions, which may be 
temporal (e.g. time since an event), spatial (e.g. ac-
cess  to  a  given  memory  address)  or  event-driven 
conditions (e.g. interruption). Next, the fault must be Figure 1. The boundary scan architecture.
injected.  Its  locality (e.g. which  state  element(s)), 
dynamics (for how long) and type (e.g. bit-flip) fully 
characterize the process.  Finally, its impact must be 
observed. This step can also be triggered by tempo-
ral (experiment timeout), spatial or event-driven (e.g 
error detected) conditions.
3.1 Fault-Trigger
Let's assume that the trigger condition for a given 
fault-injection experiment is the presence of a spe-
cific system input combination (spatial trigger). To 
handle  this  requirement  we use  the  chip's  internal 
OCD (on-chip debugging) mechanisms by program-
ming the breakpoint registers available through the 
JTAG interface. This is actually the same OCD mech-
anism originally proposed for fault-injection back in 
1995 by the Xception tool (Carreira et al. 1995).
3.1.1 Injecting the fault
When the breakpoint condition occurs, execution of 
the workload stops and fault-injection takes place. 
This  is  performed  by  reading  the  relevant  scan-
chain, flipping the bits stated in the fault model and 
writing  back  the  modified  chain  into  the  target. 
Fault-injection  may also  be  accomplished  by  resi-
dent code in the target. Compared with SWIFI, the use 
of the IEEE 1149.1 infrastructure brings two signifi-
cant advantages: it allows to disturb locations inac-
cessible to the software and avoids changes on the 
workload.  This  opens  new possibilities  e.g.  in  the 
aerospace applications  where 'test  what  you fly/fly  
what  you  test'  is  a  mandatory  requirement.  Using 
such  approach  we  can  make  final  system  testing 
without the need to leave dead, potentially danger-
ous, code in the application. However, an important 
drawback is also present: the temporal intrusiveness 
imposed is quite high and doesn't scale with target 
speed improvements.
BSCAN4FI presents a subtle difference in relation to 
GOOFI: we consider digital lines as fault targets while 
GOOFI faults  only state  elements  with transient  bit-
flips only. With this later approach single-step oper-
ation  is  unnecessary  after  the  injection.  Neverthe-
less, single stepping, a standard OCD feature, is ac-
tually used by the both approaches to study in detail 
the error  propagation.  After  a  fault  is  injected the 
system operation is resumed by writing to the appro-
priate chain.
3.2 Observation
Monitoring the system behavior after the fault-injec-
tion is a trivial process easily achieved by sampling 
the target through the different scan chains. If specif-
ic instants/locations are of interest a procedure simi-
lar to triggering the fault can be used. The Xception 
default infrastructure supports collecting the system 
output to a database to be analyzed off line. In this 
phase the BSCAN4FI plug-in goes beyond the more tra-
ditional  approaches,  providing access  to  the target 
even if it hangs.
3.3 Target Dependencies
Although  accessing  the  target  system  through  the 
IEEE 1149.1 standard interface, the boundary-scan 
based  fault-injection  poses  some  portability  con-
straints. These constraints have been thoroughly dis-
cussed in (Santos et al. 2003). First, trigger support 
and the test/system logic synchronization challenges 
are not  solved directly  through  IEEE 1149.1 stan-
dard  mechanisms,  but  rather  by  the  IEEE 1149.1 
based OCD support.  This scheme avoids the most 
problematic constraints of the boundary-scan infras-
tructure  for  fault-injection  purposes  but  are  only 
available  on processor-based targets.  Second,  even 
being a  processor,  it  is  also needed that  the OCD 
mechanism provided is accessible through the IEEE 
1149.1 (JTAG) interface. This is actually not very re-
strictive  as  many  vendors  like  ARM,  IBM,  NEC, 
Motorola and Intel adopt JTAG based OCD strategies 
in most products. However, despite using a standard 
access interface, the OCD approaches are consider-
ably  distinct.  Another  fault-injection  tool,  FlexFI 
(Benso et al. 1999), also explores the OCD mecha-
nisms of the Motorola MC68332 to perform fault-in-
jection. However it uses BDM, a scheme that impos-
es a proprietary serial debug interface developed by 
Motorola.  Moreover,  it  relies  on  instruction-made 
breakpoints,  rather  than  hardware  breakpoints.  As 
reported  in  their  paper,  this  strategy  and  the  half 
clock frequency imposed by the BDM mode, impos-
es a runtime slowdown by a factor of 70× to 90×.
Finally,  by  relying  on  built-in  mechanisms,  the 
fault-injection tool needs a way to be notified that 
the trigger condition has been reached and the target 
is frozen. There is no foreseen way in the standard 
that allows the tested component to notify the tester 
about some event. Two approaches can be taken: by 
using an additional TRACE signal pin, as was done in 
GOOFI,  or  by  continuously  polling  the  target  state 
through the scan-chain. Although ingenious, the for-
mer approach violates the requirement of using only 
the IEEE 1149.1 standard interface. In practice, this 
is not a real problem, since the surveyed targets have 
usually extra status pins, including one reserved to 
target-driven notifications.
The  later  approach  conforms  to  the  standard, 
however  it  imposes  a  non-negligible  latency  from 
the occurrence of the trigger until the injector is noti-
fied. The BSCAN4FI plug-in is fully configurable so it 
is possible to select the preferred approach. Polling 
is the default.
Interestingly,  the  most  problematic  factor  is  a 
non-technical  issue:  the  information  about  private 
IEEE  1149.1 instructions  and  additional  test  data 
registers is proprietary. Usually, it is available only 
to emulator vendors under a Non Disclosure Agree-
ment (NDA), nevertheless a practice that fully con-
forms with the IEEE 1149.1 standard.
4 CASE STUDY
To evaluate the capabilities of the  BSCAN4FI plug-in 
we  shall  now present  some  fault-injection  experi-
ments. The target hardware is an Atmel eVAB-695 
evaluation board with a TSC695F processor, 512K 
boot flash memory, and 2 banks of SRAM (2Mbyte 
each).
 The workload gravity is running on top of the 
RTEMS  4.5  real  time  kernel (RTEMS  2005). 
gravity is an application that calculates the trajec-
tory of a mass (e.g. a satellite) attracted by a bigger 
mass (e.g. a planet) using Newton's gravity law. The 
workload outputs the successive satellite positions, 
in x-y coordinates. The faults target specific applica-
tion variables such that its impact can be visualized 
by disturbances in the orbit performed by the low-
mass  object.  The  utility  gnuplot generates  a 
graphical representation of the results (Fig. 2(a)).
4.1 Manually set Faults
The goal of the first experiments is to show the ac-
curacy of the tool. The definition of faults to be in-
jected are derived from  gravity's source code de-
veloped in the programming language C. These are 
somehow 'well behaved' faults,  in that they do not 
affect the target kernel structures so the application 
keeps  running  despite  the  presence  of  these  con-
trolled disturbances (i.e. leading to pure data errors). 
The TSC695F processor has built-in parity protec-
tion for most state elements, namely the internal reg-
isters, so in this series of experiments the parity pro-
tection is circumvented by generating faults that flip 
an even number of bits. If a single bit-flip was per-
formed using (e.g.) a  SWIFI fault injector, such error 
would never be detected by this built-in capability, 
since a correct parity would be automatically gener-
ated. Now we shall present the effects of some faults 
that are injected in the application according to this 
model. 
In the core of the trajectory calculation algorithm, 
the  s.Planet.sPosition.dY variable  holds 
the 'y' coordinate of points updated in each iteration. 
This value is loaded into register %o0, so a fault in-
jected in this register leads to a transient error in this 
particular value. We set a spatial trigger on the rele-
vant instruction address to corrupt the register  %o0 
with an even bit-flip fault to be activated at the 200th 
occurrence. The faulted bits are chosen so that the 
error is easily observable.
After this fault is injected we get the output de-
picted in Figure 2(b) where the presence of the dis-
turbed point can be seen. Note that since no other 
value is affected, the computation proceeds normally 
afterwards.
Now,  we  shall  perform  a  disturbance  with 
stronger  impact.  The  initial  velocity  value,  loaded 
into register  %l4, is set to  8.0 (default is  10.0). 
The output failure can be observed in 3(a). In this 
fault the effect is not transient since due to the lower 
initial velocity the trajectory is unstable but the ap-
plication exits normally.
As a final illustration of the tool accuracy the ini-
tial  velocity is  now set to 30.0.  The effect of this 
new fault is depicted in figure 3(b). Again, the effect 
is not transient since due to the higher initial velocity 
the trajectory diverges and the application eventually 
aborts. Nevertheless the system exits normally as we 
could  observe  from  the  internal  state  collected 
through the scan chains. 
(a) Correct output of gravity
(b) Disturbance on dY
Figure 2. Effect of a transient fault in the output.
4.2 Automatically Generated Faults
The above experiments show that using the BSCAN4FI 
plug-in  the  Xception  fault-injection  environment 
provides the same accuracy offered by SWIFI. Howev-
er, the  BSCAN4FI plug-in can also perform automati-
cally  generated  faults  according  to  a  given  fault 
model.  In Table 2 we present the fail-silent viola-
tions for automatically generated faults according to 
the setup listed in Table 1.
As we have seen, only a fraction of graceful termi-
nations (the application exits normally) involve the 
generation of correct outputs. This represented a to-
tal  of  about  5.7% fail-silent  violations,  a  figure 
which agrees with previous research. The remaining 
outcomes lead to wrong outputs and/or system crash.
These  simple  observations  are  only intended to 
show the nature of data that can be collected using 
the  BSCAN4FI plug-in.  However  the  Xception  has  a 
comprehensive suite of fault-injection analysis tools 
whose description is outside the scope of this paper.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As a standalone technique, the boundary-scan in-
frastructure,  as  dictated  by  the  IEEE 1149.1 stan-
dard, can't cope with the requirements of a fault-in-
jection campaign. However, as demonstrated by pre-
vious works,  using this standard to access the on-
chip debugging (OCD) functions allows to achieve 
significant results. OCD brings support for the initial 
and the final phases of a fault-injection experiment. 
In fact, defining the injection instant is easily accom-
plished  by  programming  the  breakpoint  registers 
through the  JTAG interface.  Additionally,  while  ob-
serving the fault impact, capabilities like single-step-
ping stresses the value of boundary-scan based OCD 
integration. Time intrusiveness, a major constraint of 
this approach, has to be traded against workload in-
dependence.
The main advantage of using the standard bound-
ary-scan infrastructure derives from its ability to ac-
cess all the desired abstraction levels present on the 
target, orthogonally to the purely functional aspects. 
Additionally,  the  high  accuracy  of  this  technique 
provides the necessary support to emulate software 
faults.
The next step in the BSCAN4FI project is to extend 
the  boundary-scan  interface  to  support  the  NEXUS 
standard  as  has  been  proposed  by (Yuste  et  al. 
2003).  This  technology  standardizes  the  access  to 
the  OCD  implementations,  while  providing  IEEE 
1149.1  compatibility  at  the  basic  levels  (level  1). 
This promises to be a major step to minimize target 
dependency.
(a) Initial velocity set to 8.0
(b) Initial velocity set to 30.0
Figure 3. Effect of different permanent errors in the output.
Table 1: Fault setup used on automatic generation of faults
50% faults targeted at kernel.
50% of faults targeted the application.
50% of faults are single bit-flips.
50% of faults are double bit-flips.
1223 runs (approx. 6 hours).
Table 2. Experimental observations generated automatically. 
Code coverage RTEMS gravity
Faults targeted to 605 628









Effectively injected 110 117 248 320
Correct outcome 26% 40% 19% 48%
Graceful termination 27% 47% 20% 53%
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